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THE LIABILITY OF THE SOLICITOR -  TRUSTEE
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N .
The subject matter of this crsav has not been directly considered 
bv judicial authority, and the cas*.s that we shall examine deal mostly 
with such problems as indemnity, gitts, costs, undertakings, and remun­
eration, in transactions between solic itor and client. From these eases 
we must attempt to find out whether there is am rule of stricter liability 
for the solicitor, who is acting as solicitor and trustee of the one estate, 
than for the lay trustee.
W e arc here concerned onlv with express trusts treated either 
inter vivos or bv will, and for convenience, we shall refer only to the 
trust created b\ will, although the propositions wc shall attempt to 
formulate, will applv cqualh to trusts created inter vivos and by will.
Fquitv has not alwavs adopted a fixed and definite standard to 
determine the liability of a trustee for breath of trust. During its 
history, cquitv has swung from a high standard to a higher and almost 
intolerable one. Statute law lias relieved trustees from this responsibil­
ity in certain cases, and even courts of cquitv themselves have realized 
that the high standard thc\ had set max defeat its own purpose bv 
making the trust unpopular; nevertheless the precedent for the higher 
standard remains and may be revived in case of need; it will be the 
subject of this essay to suggest that the court would revive this higher 
standard in the ease of the solicitor trustee.
T he term “Breach of Trust” is an clastic one, what may be a 
breach of trust for one set of facts, may not be so for another. T he  
confincs of “Breach of Trust” arc never closed. (1)
W hen a solicitor is acting only as a trustee and not also as solicitor 
of the trust estate, his liability will be the same as any other profession­
al or business man, who suddenly finds himself appointed a trustee. 
The special ease we arc considering is that of the solicitor, who is act­
ing as the solicitor of, and trustee to, the same trust, and who is advising 
his bencficiarics, and co-trustees of their rights, duties and respon­
sibilities under the trust.
The relation between a solicitor and his client is confidential and 
fiduciary; so also is the relation between a trustee and his beneficiary-. 
The position of a solidtor-trir,tee, must merit special consideration by 
courts of equity. Very often the solicitor will have drawn up the W ill 
or other instrument treating the trust; thus a confidential and fiduciary 
relation will have preceded, and vcrv often will have been responsible 
for the appointment of the solicitor as a solicitor trustee. This itself 
would be sufficient to demand the closer scrunitv of the courts.
( ! )  I h i i h i n x  M o d rn i  l-.ijtulx lu l  id .  ¡i. 2(>/
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A iiost of duties mav be mentioned which, by their nature, must 
be fulfilled alike by lav and solicitor trustees. For example: the duty 
to render an account, to observe the rule in Howe v. Lord Dart­
mouth (2). N o one can be compelled to assume the duties of a 
trustee but the courts will not permit anyone who has assumed these 
duties to sav that he lacked business or professional experience. 
Stupidity or ignorance, as well as wilful default, may be a ground for 
liability. There are many such cases in the reports. The duties of a 
trustee arc enfoccd without regard to the personality or qualifications 
of the person acting.
The liabilitv of the ordinarv trustee may be both civil and crim­
inal. The solicitor, being an officer of the court, is subject to a penal 
liability outside the scopc of criminal law and unknown in other pro­
fessions. A study of both the penal and the civil side of liability may 
reveal some general principle that will answer the enquiry of this 
essay.
II A R G U M E N T
As a rule trustees arc all equally responsible to the beneficiaries 
for any breach of trust. N o trustee can set up as a defence that may 
amount to a breach of trust, and it has been laid down that a trustee is 
not entitled to any indemnity against loss brought about by following 
the advice of his co-trustee who happens to be a solicitor (3). The 
latter is protected in the same way as any other person who is carrying 
out an onerous duty. But when a trustee has relied innocently with­
out negligence on the advice of his solicitor-co-trustec, the position 
may be different. There is no authority directly in point, but Ham­
mond v. Walker (3) is authority when the solicitor is acting only as 
trustee and not as solicitor-trustee. T he rule here suggested is that 
there may be a right to indemnity in the co-trustee where the solicitor 
trustee is acting qua solicitor in the trust administration.
There is some support for the proposition that a lay trustee may 
be entitled to indemnity from his co-trustee who is a solicitor-trustee. 
Reillv v. Lockhart (4) is an example. Here, a solicitor-trustee who 
had been entrusted with the management of the trust, was held liable 
to indemnify his co-trustee for the costs and expenses of proceedings 
arising out of his negligence. In a later case (5) this right of indem­
nity was extended to cover all loss arising by the solicitor- trus­
tee's negligence. W e must be cautious in our acceptance of this 
case as an authority for the broader liability. Cotton, L. J. felt that 
such a rule did exist but the authorities that he cited cannot be said to 
go as far as his Lordship contended. In the same case, Fry, L. J. em­
phatically and unequivocally refused to recognize any such rule even in 
the case of a solicitor-trustee. Bowen, L. J. diffidently agreed with 
Cotton, L. J.
(2) (1802) 7 Ves 137
(3) H a m m o n d  v. Walker (1854) 3 Jur. N.S. 686
(4) (1856) 25 L.J. Ch. 697. See also in re. Linsley (1904) L.J. Ch. 841.
and in re. Turner  (1897) 66 L.J. Ch. 282.
(5) Baltin v. Hughes (1886) 55 L.J. Ch. />. 472.
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A distinction was drawn in I lead v. Gould (6). A trustee wlio had 
participated with his solicitor-trustcc in the trust management was held 
to have no right of indemnity whatever. As a general rule, equity will 
not recognize a passive trustee in an active trust. W here a solicitor is 
appointed trustee either bv the court or the instrument and is entrusted 
with the management of the estate, the court will consider his co-trustee 
in thc<?apacitv of a passive trustee. This is borne out by the policy of 
indemnity. Since a distinction is made between an active and passive 
trustee in this case, we may say with some force that the court’s policy 
is in favor of some indemnity for the passive but innocent trustee, otlicr- 
wisc it would be needless to draw anv line at all. The authority of 
Bahin v. Hughes (S) must rest upon its age rather than its merits. 
Since it has never been overruled, we may take our stand that it 
represents the law. At any rate, it is a pointer, indicating the policy 
of the court, when the liability of the solicitor-trustcc arises.
The strong language of Lord Haldane’s speech in Nocton v Ash­
burton (7) cannot be overlooked. The ratio must ncccssarilv be lim­
ited to the case of solicitor dealing with the client’s own personal 
business. But the great authority of Lord Haldane, as an equity jurist, 
compels us to respect his wide dicta which may be said to cover all 
cases of solicitor and client even where both arc trustees of the same 
estate. The result of all these cases is that a solicitor may be held liable 
qua solicitor to indemnify his client against loss in certain circum­
stances and, therefore, that a solicitor-trustcc must indemnify his client 
trustee, where the solicitor is negligent, and the co-trustcc is innocent. 
The co-trustcc mav be considered constructively the client of the solic­
itor because of the natural confidcncc which the former will place in 
the latter. The standard which is cxpcetcd of the solicitor in all the 
foregoing eases is that of the prudent solicitor. W hen acting as 
trustee he must act as a prudent business man would act but lie must 
also apply the prudent standard of the solicitor if lie works professionally 
in the trust administration. Trustees empowered, for instance, to 
invest in the mortgage of real estate mav consult and rely on their 
solicitor-trustcc as did Lord Ashburton in his own personal business. 
Thus the rule in Nocton v. Ashburton (7) lends its support to the other. 
The solicitor’s responsibility is clear and it can surely be no dcfcncc 
to the negligent solicitor that his co-trustcc is under a fiduciary relation 
to another. Thus Nocton v. Ashburton (7) would support the prop­
osition that a fiduciary relation w'ill exist in a solicitor whose client is 
his co-trustcc.
W ere all this authority, we might justly hesitate to accept the 
principle of indemnity to which we have referred. There is, however, 
another line of eases covering a slightly different matter which throws 
some light on the attitude of the court to the dealings of a solicitor. 
These eases deal with the enforcement of what is called the “solicitor’s 
undertaking”. The climax of this scries is Re. Hilliard (8) where it was
(A) (IS99) 2 Ch. 2*1).
(7)  ( W V )  .V? / . . / .  Ch.7X1.
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held that a solicitor may be liable upon his undertaking, notwithstand­
ing that such undertaking would not be enforceable as a contract or 
impose liability as an estop,pel. In the course of his judgment, Coleridge 
J. said—“The court does so (i.e. enforces the undertaking) with a view of 
securing honesty in the conduct of its officers, in all matters which they 
undertaKe.” Halsburv (9) dealing with the same matter, comments as 
follows — “The Jurisdiction (of the court to enforce undertakings) is 
based upon the right of the court to require its officers to a high stan­
dard of conduct.” In United M ining & Finance Corp., Ltd. v. Becher 
(10) the trial judge held that the court would enforce these undertak­
ings' regardless of the lack of imputations of dishonesty. The process 
or the court may be used against a completely honest solicitor and in 
favor of a stranger who may not be his client and in cases where the 
solicitor has acted gratuitously. The solicitor must act in the capacity 
of a solicitor in relation to the undertaking.
All the authorities (11) are agreed on the high standard of pro­
fessional conduct which the court requires. The rule is of universal 
application and is not limited to any particular class of business provid­
ed that the undertaking be made in the course of c.uty as a solicitor. 
There can, therefore, be no objection to its application between 
solicitor-trustec on the one hand and co-trustee, cestui que trust or 
strangers to the trust on the other, to render a solicitor liable where he 
has not been negligent.
These cases illustrate the general policy of the court in reviewing 
the conduct of solicitors: a policv suggestive of and consistent with a 
practice of strict scrutiny. There can be no room for doubt that the 
lay trustee is outside the application of this and equally no room for 
doubt that here exists a potential of increased liability to the solicitor- 
trustec.
It is a general principle of equity that a trustee cannot make a 
profit out of the estate. This is a corollary of another rule 
approved by Fullerton, J. A. in McLcllan v. Newton (12) that “it is 
a rule of universal application that no trustee shall be allowed to enter 
into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest con­
flicting, or which possibly conflict, with the interests of those whom he
is bound by fiduciary duty to protect.........So strictly is this principle
adhered to that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness 
or unfairness of the transaction; for it is enough that the parties object."
(8) (1S45) I..]. (¿.B. 225.
(9) Laws of England Vol. X X X I  P. 1008.
(10) (1910 79 J.J. K.B.
1006 and at
P. 1008
(11) See also lies a solicitor exp. Hales (1907) 76 L.J. K.B. 931 where it was held
that lapse of  time is no bar. These undertakings are enforced summarily  in
England under R.S.C. 0.52 r. 25.
(12) (1928) I.D .L.R. 189 (C.A. at P. ¡91.
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There ran be no doubt of the soundness of such a mlc nor of the urgen­
cy of its strict application. Its importance here must be tested by 
its application to solicitor-trustec.
T he rule is so wide and emphatic that it might be expected to 
apply to lay and solicitor trustees alike. Thus it would appear that 
equity made no distinction. There is some authority that in the ease 
of the solicitor-trustec the foregoing result is obtained bv another line 
of reasoning showing the particular disfavour of the court towards 
the solicitor trustee. In New v Jones (13) the court held that it was 
an incapacity in a solicitor-trustcc to receive costs and that this in­
capacity was passed on to his firm. W here an instrument entitles 
the solicitor to his costs and charges, it will be strictly construed (14). 
Any claim under a testamentary instrument will be construed as a 
legacy and the solicitor will be entitled to nothing if the estate is 
insolvent (15). The claim will be subject to Icgacy duty (IS). Thus 
lav trustees may receive remuneration under the trust instrument 
without the imputation of a gift. If the settlor or testator has seen fit 
to reimburse them in this way. the court will take no objection. The  
solicitor-trustec takes such a benefit grudgingly granted by the court 
as a mere gift of the privilege to charge for his fees and costs.
It may be well to interrupt the argument at this point with a few 
words on the court’s policy towards a gift inter vivos from a client to 
his solicitor. Kindcrslcy, V . C. reviewed the authorities in Tomson 
v. Judge (17)where he laid down the firm rule that a gift bv a clicnt 
to his solicitor cannot be sustained while the fiduciary relation con­
tinues to exist. It docs not ccase to exist simply because the solicitor 
is acting gratuitously or becausc the clicnt is no longer consulting the 
solicitor in legal business but continues as long as the confidcnce 
naturally arising from the old relation continues (18). T he onus of 
proving the discontinuance is always upon the solicitor. W hat is the 
difference between a gift inter vivos and a gift by will? It is submitted 
that the legal position of both when they are acccptcd by a solicitor 
is the same. In the ease of a will, there mav be a period between its 
making and the death where no fiduciary relation will exist. This is 
the solicitor’s burden to prove and until this is done the gift should 
be construed as invalid. Although there is no authority for this 
proposition it has the merit of being consistent with principle.
It is therefore possible to elicit a completely different reasoning 
in dealing with the costs of the solicitor-trustec. It springs from the 
complete incapacity in the solicitor to accept payment; an incapacity 
that is relaxcci only occasionally.
(13) (IS33) 11 F..R. U29.
(U) Harbin x>. Darby (IS60) 28 Beau. 325.
(/*) While ,  re Pennell  j>. Franklin (1898) 67 /-./. Ch. 502.
(17) (IS'O) 19 Ch. 107.
(18) Demerara Hausile Co. i>. H ubbard  11923) AC 673.
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This argument is not altogether without support. Vice-Chancellor 
Turner in Lincoln v. W indsor (19) laid it down that a solicitor-trustee 
is entitled only to out-of-pocket expenses whether lie is a sole trustee 
or is acting with others. The reason given is that these costs (in lion- 
contentious matters) arc not automatically subject to the scrunity of 
the court and would be so subject only if the bcncficiarics should object 
to them. In Craddock v. Piper (20), Lord Cottenham remarked that 
a solicitor-trustec is very likelv to be entrusted with the exclusive man­
agement of suits conccrning trust property and with a large discretion. 
This case dealt with the allowance of costs in contentious matters 
and His Lordship decided after reviewing the authorities that a solicit­
or was, m such a case, entitled to costs only when acting for himself 
alone or for himself and co-trustees. They are allowed if they are not 
increased by the action of the solicitor. The reason that costs such 
as the above arc permitted is that they must be taxed and are there­
fore strictly supervised bv the Court. Our interest in this case is not 
so much a concern with the allowance of costs as with the fact that it 
should have been so long unsettled that such costs would be allowed. 
It is almost as though the accepted principle of practice had been that 
a solicitor-trustec was not entitled to any costs at all. The very strict 
and parsimonious allowance to solicitor-trustces in such a case even 
where court supervision is automatic leads to the general principle 
that the position of a solicitor-trustec involves the very highest stand­
ard — one that will ensure by every means that no conflict of interest 
and dutv will arise.
Under the Trustee Act (21) a trustee whether appointed by deed, 
settlement or will is permitted such an allowance for his care, pain 
and trouble as may be granted by the court. This section includes 
solicitor- trustees as well as others. Under a Nova Scotia Statute (22) 
it is cnactcd that a solicitor will be entitled to charge for his profession­
al services as a trustee, provided no charges shall be made for any service 
which an executor or trustee must render without the intervention of 
a solicitor. There is no similar provision in N ew  Brunswick, but in 
Nova Scotia there is a section similar to our Sect.49. The inference 
we must draw from this is that Sect.49 does not give the right to a 
solicitor to charge for his professional services (23). In a Manitoba 
case Turriff v. M cDonald (24), it is laid down that where a statute 
gives a solicitor a right to remuneration for his care, pains and trouble, 
lie should be made such allowance only as the court thinks fair. He 
is not entitled as of right to be remunerated as a solicitor.
(19) ( / ,V5/) 20 I..]. Ch. f ) I  See also Stanes v. Parker 
(18(16) 50 l  .lt. 392.
(20) (1850) 19 L.J. Ch. 107.
(21) Section -19 Ch. 175 R.S.N.B.
(22) Ch.
212 Section 56 R.S.N.R. 192).
(23) See Huggard v. Prudential Ins. Co. 1921 /H 'l t ’/i  642, Which was a case deal­
ing with R.S.M. 200, and a solicitor director in circumstances similar 
to a solicitor-trustee.
(24) (1901) 1 ) M A N  1{ 577
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There are mam cases in the reports where the court has declined 
to appoint a solicitor as trustee. In re. Kemp’s Settled Estates (25) 
Cotton. L. J. condemned the appointment o f the tenant for life, or 
his solicitor. The ratio decidendi is simply that the court will not 
appoint as a trustee anyone, who is interested in the trust, or his agent. 
Doubtless the learned judge was applying the rule mentioned aDove 
(26) as to conflict of duty and interest, and nothing more. It does not 
appear from the judgment that he was laying down any principle on 
the appointment of solicitors. Although the court may have wide 
power of appointing new trustees it will never make any appointment 
which it considers undesirable. Sincc he will usually be associated 
professionally with some of the parties to the trust, the solicitor will, 
therefore, be an objectionable appointment. The guiding principle 
of the court is the interest of all the beneficiaries, and the efficient man­
agement of the trust. (27)
Although the English courts have not completely avoided solicit­
ors when appointing trustees, they have adopted a practice which illus­
trates their caution, and it may be said, their disfavour. An undertak­
ing by the solicitor appointed is inserted in the order to the effect that 
lie will immediately seek the appointment of a new and independent 
trustee, should he himself become sole trustee (28). This is the only 
suggestion we arc given as to the policy of the courts. It is submitted 
that, once the appointment has been made, the court will exercise its 
vigilance more strongly against the solicitor-trustec, in accordance w'itli 
the general principle which is being formulated here.
The Supreme Court has an inherent jurisdiction to review the 
conduct of its officers. This conduct must be in keeping with the 
public officc which a barrister or solicitor is called upon to fulfil. The 
Corpus Juris gives a brief outline of the important duties which these 
legal functionaries are required to carry out. Under the Barristers’ Soc­
iety Act, Scct. 19 (29), the council of the Barristers’ Society may, of 
its own motion and shall on the application of am person, enquire into 
complaints. There arc several grounds set out in the Act on which a 
complaint may be made, but the most important one for our purpose 
is the simple ground that the barrister or solicitor has been guiltv of 
conduct unbecoming a solicitor. These words do not ncccssarilv 
impute any dishonesty to a solicitor. It has ever been held that a
(2*) (1883 24 Ch. P. IS* mid  v r  generally Annual Practice 
(1941) P. I/6S
(26) t i d e  note (12) Supra.
(27) He Tempest  (1886) I li I Ch. 48*.
(28) See A nnual Practice (1941) p.
/ lf>8; also re Cotton, lennings S’ye
(IV/*) I Ch. 107 and oilier case to which Annual Practice refers.
(29) ch. *0 A d s  of  the Legislature (1931) and see the Corpus Juris vol. 6 p. *68
"Xalure  of the Office."
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solicitor becomes subject to the council’s enquiry if he lias not fulfilled 
an undertaking given in the course of his professional duty. Accept­
ing as we must the general high standard required of solicitors by the 
court, we may assume that a very large sphere of activity which would 
be quite innocent in a layman, will be subject to censure by both the 
court and the council established under the Act.
Recent legislation in England is of some interest to show the con­
cern with which the British legislature regards the position of solicitor 
trustees. This act (30) provides, inter alia, strict provisions for the 
solicitor to keep separate accounts of all trust funds which come into 
his hands, as solicitor-trustee. T he council under the act is empowered 
to ensure compliance, and may require a solicitor to produce his ac­
counts. Furthermore, a solicitor must pay over all money received 
(with some practical exceptions) into separate bank accounts. The 
rules further require that he shall obtain the authority of the council 
set up by the Act, before any sums are withdrawn. In some cases, 
mainly concerned with routine amounts, the money may be withdrawn 
without this authority.
This legislation came as an aftermath of a series of frauds which 
had been com m itted bv solicitors who were both express and con­
structive trustees. These criminal practices had, in many cases, left 
the clients and beneficiaries in pecuniary difficulties, a state of affairs 
for which the bench vigorously demanded suitable and adequate rem­
edies. In the criminal proceedings which resulted, the courts did not 
hesitate to mete out to the offender the severest penalties of the law.
The record of the legal profession in this Province is unblemished 
in comparison with the pre-war defalcations in England, and although 
we do not have the same disciplinary machinery, we have a valuable 
protection to the public in the Barristers’ Society Act (31). Provisions 
of Sect. 30 are wide enough to ensure that any conduct falling short 
of that of a gentleman in the exercise of his profession will render a 
solicitor liable to account for himself and perhaps to suffer the ignominv 
of being struck off the rolls, when he has failed to meet the standard. 
W hat will amount to professional conduct unbecoming a solicitor 
in order to found an application to strike off the rolls? Darling J. in 
the case of in r e - A ¿olicitor,ex parte Law Society (30) approved a 
definition, which was again approved in a later case (33), that anv con­
duct disgraceful in the eyes or his fellow solicitors would be sufficient
(30) Solicitor’s Act (1941) In particular Sect. 18 and the regulations made there­
under, nam ely : Solicitors Trust Accounts Rules — 1945.
(31) Act of Legislature N.B. C.50 — 1931.
(32) (1912) 81 L.J. K.B. 245 and
see definition given in Allison v. General Council of Medical Education and  
Registration (1894) 631 I..1.Q.B. 534 at 540.
(33) R e  A Solicitor (No. 2) (1924) 93 L.J. K.B. 461.
to wan int the action of the council in striking him oft the rolls The 
court mav, of its own motion, order that a solicitor be struck off. 
Thompson v. H ind i (34) is an example. Merc the solicitor-trustee 
wrongly invested trust moncv. N o fraud was alleged, and the Law 
Society had taken 1 10 action. Nevertheless, the court ordered, ex nicro 
niotu, that such action be taken.
i he criminal liability of the solicitor exists quite independently 
of any disciplinary action bv the court or the Barristers’ Society.
20 U.N.tt .  L A W  S C H O O L  J O U R N A L
I ll  C O N C L U SIO N
A solicitor-trustec, as he is understood here, must fulfill a 
double function. He is trustee and solicitor 111 the administration of 
the 0 1 1c trust. Thus, lie must fulfill the duties of both at once. It may 
be. however, that the sphere of dutv of both, coincide, so that the or­
dinary relation of solicitor and c lient involves the same'responsibility 
as trustee and cestui que trust Should IIun be the case, then there 
would be 1 10 increased liability when tin solicitor becomes a trustee. 
Such an argument is clearly a non-sequitui tor even if the duties do 
coincide, it docs not follow that the court vviil not distinguish classes of 
trustees. On the other hand, the duties of the two functions mav 
merely overlap. The situation then will be that certain duties will 
be peculiar to the solicitor qua solicitor. That this is so is obvious 
from the unique liability flowing from the solicitor’s undertaking.
Apart from authority, it seems logical to expect that the solic­
itor trustee would be under a greater liability than a lav trustee. 
I he office of trustee is an onerous one for which the courts have from 
time to time relaxed their severity. However, this leniency is reserved 
for particular cases and is the exception, not tlu- rule. \lthough the 
excepted cases mav be more numerous than instances of the rule itself, 
vvc should not lose sight of the very high standard formerly required. \  
standard which seems to be taken for granted In most text book writers 
for thcv cite no authority for it.
Wc have considered liability 111 a general wav, now vvc must refer 
! 1 particular parties, namely: co-trustccs, beneficiaries and stiangers to 
the tnr.t I lie enforcement bv the summary jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of the undertaking of the solic itor i'. not only unique 
to the legal profession but it pervades every ispeet of its activities.
I lie undertaking must be made while the solicitor is acting profession­
ally <3(n. It must be clear in its terms so that the damages arc capablc of 
measurement (3“ i.
( • / i  , I S 2 * 1 /  /. ( It. h S  I .
i >«• t I nilril .Mining nml I niiini'i' (lot¡>. 1 lil. v. Hi • In i t l ,,iii). !') ] ] h.l l  ¡006.
N.-»• .¡'•n lh I'llHH/i* | ISSli) h Mini. / It I"'.
i 1 I h< mi  / m m  1». I i ni  i l  m i  1 I S  l(t \  I ' / . I t \ ' I I
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'Lake the case of the trustee in Low v. Bouverie (38) where Lind- 
ley, L. J. gave the opinion which was approved bv Lord Haldane 
in N octon v. Ashburton (39) ,that a trustee may f)ccome liable if 
what lie has said would amount to a cause of action. In this case, a 
trustee had given information about charges and encumbrances on the 
trust fund but he did not mention all or them. Insofar as a solicitor’s 
undertaking is more in the nature of a cause of action, it is submitted 
that a solicitor-trustee would be liable, where a lay trustee would not.
..T h e  enforcement of an undertaking defeats such defences as the Statute 4 
of Frauds and nudum pactum which would be op,cn to the lay trustee* 
against a stranger. This is one example of a fertile source of liability, 
and cases could be multiplied. It woifid be difficult inclced for a solici- 
tor-trustec to show that his undertaking was not given in a professional I 
capacity. In most cases in which a solicitor would be consulted about 
the trust fund, his undertakings would involve the legal part of his 
cfficc of solicitor-trustee. Thus, the liability to third parties may be 
greater than in the case of the lay trustee.
T he court is given a discretion under Sect.49 of the Trustee Act 
(40) to relieve a trustee who has committed a breach of trust, provided 
he has acted honestly and reasonably. In National Trustee Co. of 
Australia v. General Finance etc. Co. (41) the Privy Council held 
that honesty and reasonableness were matters that the court must con­
sider before granting relief. Other circumstances must also be taken 
into account and special matters affecting the relationship between 
the beneficiaries and the trustees are most important. In this case, 
the trustee wras a Trust Corporation and was accepting a fee. The 
court held that remuneration was such a matter affecting the relation 
of trustee and cestui-que trust and refused to grant reliefT
This was an Australian case but the legislative provisions under 
review were the same as our own (42). The ratio of the case seems to 
be that when some special situation exists between the fund, the bene­
ficiary and the trustee of which remuneration is an example, the court 
will not exercise its discretion. W hen a solicitor is appointed trustee, it 
is usually because of natural confidcnce which the parties repose in him. 
This is a circumstance which the court would be entitled to notice 
before granting relief. W e have seen how cautiously the court super­
vises the charges and costs allowed to a solicitor-trustee and we have 
analyzed the principle involved in the enforcement of undertakings. 
These rules converge to require of the members of the legal profession 
a standard of conduct which must be unassailable and which will make 
it difficult to excuse a breach of trust under any circumstances. It 
would be illogical to set up such a high moral and legal standard on the 
one hand and to relieve the solicitor-trustee on the other hand simply
(38) (1891) 60 L.J. Ch. 594 at P. 596.
(39) (1914) 83 L.J. Ch. 784.
(40) R.S.N.li.  (1927) C /7*.
(41) (1905 ) 74 L.l.  P. 73.
(42) R.S.N.li. C 175 See 49.
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bccausc lie is honest. It is true that lie may satisfy the court of his 
honesty but reasonableness is relative to the standard by which it is 
judged. From this point of \icw . also, a solicitor-trustcc would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to justify himself. Section 49 of the 
Trustee Act contemplates relief from the liability for breach of trust 
and it would render nugatorx the undoubted principles referred to above 
if we found that a solicitor-trustcc could exonerate himself by pleading 
this section.
Following the maxim "Fqualitv is Fquity,’’ the courts will usually 
permit contribution between co-trustees who arc “in pari delicto.”
This is not the case w ith indemnity because equity docs not rccognizc 
a passive trustee. All trustees must be active in an active trust. H ow­
ever, there is authority to show that when a solicitor is one of the trust­
ees.the others may be able to claim an indemnity (44). It would be 
a case of circular argument to suggest that because an indemnity is so 
awarded, a solicitors co trustees must be looked upon as passive and 
that since they arc passive trustees then thcv should be awarded an 
indemnity. It is submitted that the court has applied, in these cases, 
the rule laid down in Nocton v. Ashburton (4^) and has thus set up 
and confirmed its separate and special treatment of solicitor-trustccs.
There is one matter in which the solicitor-trustcc would seem to 
fare equally with the lav trustee. In re. M cM . Trust (46) where a solici­
tor trustee had delegated the receipt of rents to his clerk who subse­
quently absconded with a considerable portion of the trust income, the 
solicitor was held not liable for breach of trust. This ease purported to 
apply the rule in Speight v. Gaunt (47)., the leading authority on del­
egation b\ trustees. W hile wc may admit the principle permitting even 
solicitor-trustccs to delegate certain functions, it would be illogical to 
regard the standard of care required of the lav trustee in the matter of 
delegation as the standard of his legal confreres. I lere too the solicitor- 
trustcc must be hikcn on the same footing as he is in other transactions.
The court is the final arbiter of liability and this article has attemp­
ted to point out the high standard of the legal profession enforced bv 
sanctions of a special nature.
W c may conclude with a quotation from Ilanburv in which lie 
adopts a statement in Maitland’s famous work ¡48) that sums up and 
confirms our conclusions — “F.quitv is hard upon a trustee and it is 
hard on a solicitor; in a case where the two functions arc combined, 
it w ill be very hard indeed.”
—bv W illiam V Gibbon.
Barrister,
Saint John. \ .  B
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